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ABSTRACT Theoretical neuroscience, which characterizes neural mechanisms
using mathematical and computational models,is highly relevant to central problems in
the philosophy of psychiatry.These models can help to solve the explanation problem
of causally connecting neural processes with the behaviors and experiences found in
mental illnesses. Such explanations will also be useful for generating better classifica-
tions and treatments of psychiatric disorders.The result should help to eliminate con-
cerns that mental illnesses such as depression and schizophrenia are not objectively real.
A philosophical approach to mental illness based on neuroscience need not neglect the
inherently social and historical nature of mental phenomena.
T
HIS ARTICLE ADDRESSES four major problems in the philosophy of psychia-
try: objectivity, classification, treatment, and explanation. The objectivity
problem revolves around whether mental illnesses such as schizophrenia and
depression are real physical disorders or merely social constructions.The classifi-
cation problem concerns the validity of taxonomies of mental illnesses, such as
those provided by the widely used Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Dis-
orders (DSM).The treatment problem centers on whether it is possible to im-
prove upon current practices that are often haphazard in prescribing drugs and
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other remedies for mental illnesses. Finally, the explanation problem concerns
the gap between neuroscientific accounts of how the brain works and the men-
tal experiences that are part of psychiatric illnesses.
I argue that a solution to the explanation problem has the potential to solve
the other three problems as well.Improved theories about the neural mechanisms
that produce mental experience should help to establish the biological objectiv-
ity of psychiatry,provide a more reliable basis for classifying psychiatric disorders,
and generate more reliable treatment regimens.As the most likely source for the
needed theories, I look to the emerging field of theoretical neuroscience, which
uses mathematical analysis and computational modeling to characterize neural
mechanisms that can explain a broad range of mental phenomena.
Because this essay was prepared for the conference “Future Horizons for the
Philosophy of Medicine?” I begin with a brief discussion of the nature of phi-
losophy and its application to medicine.I argue against conceptions of the nature
of philosophy that take its intellectual role to the pursuit of necessary truths or
conceptual clarifications.These conceptions see philosophy as standing above or
below the sciences, whereas I see it as standing side by side, hand in hand, aim-
ing to develop general theories about the nature of reality,knowledge,and right
and wrong.This article illustrates this naturalistic approach to the philosophy of
medicine, using theories from cognitive science and neuroscience to address
philosophical issues about the nature of medical knowledge of mental illness.
What Is Philosophy of Medicine?
What is philosophy, and how is it related to science?To answer these questions,
I want to reject two highly influential approaches to philosophy,the Platonic and
theWittgensteinian.According to Plato,the kind of empirical knowledge gained
by science is a mere shadow of fundamental knowledge that can be gained by
reflection on the Forms, which are abstract ideas that capture the essence of
things. From this perspective, philosophy should aim for truths that are a priori
(gained prior to any sense experience) and necessary (true in all possible worlds,
not just ours). Many philosophers have sought such necessary truths, from Plato
to Aquinas to Leibniz to Kant to Kripke.The problem is that no one seems to
have found any:the best candidate for universal adoption that I know of is Hilary
Putnam’s (1983) rather trivial “truth” that not every statement is both true and
false. In particular, if anyone in the philosophy of medicine has arrived through
a priori reflection at some necessary truths, the news does not seem to have hit
the journals.
Wittgenstein propounded a view of philosophy much less ambitious than the
Platonic aim to find necessary truths. In the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1971),
he stated:
Philosophy is not one of the natural sciences.
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The object of philosophy is the logical clarification of thoughts.
Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity.
A philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations.
Philosophy does not result in “philosophical propositions,” but rather in the
clarification of propositions. (p. 49, propositions 4.111–4.112)
On this view, the role of philosophical activity is the clarification of concepts
using logic,or,in the laterWittgenstein,ordinary language.Whereas the Platonic
view of philosophy places it above the sciences, establishing more solid kinds of
knowledge, the Wittgensteinian view places philosophy below the sciences, at
most clarifying and elucidating its results. Philosophy “leaves everything as it is”
(Wittgenstein 1968, p. 49e, section 124).
I have many objections to this view of philosophy,but will here mention only
one.The view that philosophy is concerned with conceptual clarification rests
on a false view of concepts that supposes that they have meaning independent
of the theories in which they are embedded.There are both philosophical and
psychological arguments that the meaning of concepts is utterly bound up with
theories that contain them (Medin 1989;Quine 1963).It is impossible to under-
take conceptual clarification without critically examining the truth of the scien-
tific and philosophical theories that employ the concepts.To take an example
from the philosophy of medicine, it is pointless to clarify concepts such as “dis-
ease” without scrutinizing explanatory theories of what causes diseases. It turns
out for theoretical reasons that the idea of a conceptual confusion is itself a con-
ceptual confusion.Hence,the meager ambitions of theWittgensteinian approach
to philosophy are unachievable.
I prefer a naturalistic approach to philosophy, which in the past century is
most associated with the philosopherW.V. O. Quine, although he has had many
illustrious predecessors.Thinkers whose philosophical investigations have pro-
ceeded in intimate connection with scientific research include Aristotle, Locke,
J. S. Mill, Peirce, Dewey, and Bertrand Russell in his later work.The three main
branches of philosophy are epistemology (the theory of knowledge),metaphysics
(the theory of reality),and ethics (the theory of right and wrong).From the nat-
uralistic perspective, epistemology is tightly connected with psychology and the
other cognitive sciences,and metaphysics draws on all the sciences,from research
in physics relevant to the nature of space and time to research in psychology
concerning the relation of mind and body. Ethics is not a stand-alone subject
that searches for a priori moral truths or elucidation of ethical concepts, but
rather collaborates with relevant sciences such as psychology,economics,biology,
and anthropology to develop theories of right and wrong.
The main differences between philosophy and the sciences are that philoso-
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phy is more general and more normative. Philosophy is more general in that it
deals with knowledge and reality in all domains, whereas the sciences try to
develop knowledge of reality in particular spheres such as terrestrial life, which
is the concern of biology.Philosophy is more normative in that its investigations
in epistemology and ethics are unavoidably concerned not just with how things
are,but also with how things ought to be.Philosophy addresses not only how we
think and act, but also how we can think and act better. Some sciences also have
a substantial normative component, for example educational psychology, which
tries to find better ways of learning and teaching.Medicine also has a large nor-
mative aspect,looking for ways to improve health as well as explain disease.Even
physics, when it is applied in engineering, can be concerned with how to do
things better. But in all of these sciences most research is directed less toward
normative issues than toward descriptive ones,such as how the mind works,how
diseases arise, and how physical forces operate. In philosophy, however, norma-
tive issues are unavoidably central in ethical and epistemological investigations.
I will now try to show how naturalism can contribute to the philosophy of
medicine. After reviewing what theoretical neuroscience is increasingly con-
tributing to the understanding of mind, I will project what it can potentially
offer for central problems in the philosophy of psychiatry.Finally,I defend a neu-
roscientific, naturalistic approach to mental illness from the charge that it ignores
the inherently social and historical nature of mental phenomena.
Theoretical Neuroscience
Just as medical specialties such as cardiology and dermatology depend on biolog-
ical knowledge of organs like the heart and skin, so psychiatry depends on neu-
roscience, which investigates the brain and nervous system.Neuroscience uses ex-
perimental techniques such as single-cell recording and brain scanning to make
generalizations about the operations of neurons and brain regions.Bringing order
to the masses of generalizations compiled by experimental neuroscience requires
theoretical investigations of the mechanisms by which brains accomplish such
cognitive functions as perception, memory, and problem solving.
In contemporary cognitive science,there are two main theoretical approaches
(for reviews, seeThagard 2005, n.d.-a).The first, symbolic approach grew up in
the 1950s and 1960s at the intersection of psychology and artificial intelligence.
Researchers such as Herbert Simon,Allan Newell, and John R.Anderson have
developed computational models of how people can use rules to represent the
world and solve complex problems.The second,connectionist approach arose in
the 1980s,with arguments that various kinds of thinking are better explained in
terms of sub-symbolic representations consisting of multiple, interacting, neu-
ron-like units that compute in parallel,roughly the way that that the brain does.
However,connectionist models are only crudely brain-like,neglecting many fea-
tures such as modular organization and the use of very large numbers of neurons
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ing much more closely to the structures and processes that operate in the brain
(Dayan andAbbott 2001;Eliasmith andAnderson 2003;O’Reilly and Munakata
2000).The study of rule-based symbolic systems is also moving closer to neuro-
science, as investigators attempt to tie such systems’ functioning with neural
operations (Anderson et al. 2004).
Theoretical neuroscience uses mathematical and computational methods to
characterize the operations of nervous systems at many levels, from individual
neurons to interacting brain areas. Dayan and Abbott (2001) describe how the-
oretical neuroscience uses both descriptive models, which summarize experi-
mental data,and mechanistic models,which use known anatomy and physiology
to explain how nervous systems operate.Philosophers of science are increasingly
recognizing the importance of mechanistic explanations, in which an event or
regularity is explained by showing how it is produced by a mechanism,or a sys-
tem of components whose properties, relations, and interactions produce regu-
lar changes (Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005; Bechtel and Richardson 1993; Cra-
ver 2007; Machamer, Darden, and Craver 2000; Salmon 1984). Mechanistic
explanations are ubiquitous in medicine, where a disorder is explained by
describing how multiple causes interact with biological systems to produce the
symptoms and development of a disease (Thagard 1999, 2006).
Theoretical neuroscience uses mathematical techniques drawn from linear
algebra, calculus, and statistics to characterize neural mechanisms.The primary
components in these mechanisms are neurons,cells whose most important prop-
erty is their ability to generate electrical signals in response to chemical inputs
from other cells.When a neuron’s electrical potential reaches a threshold,it fires
(spikes) by sending chemical inputs to other neurons via synaptic connections.
Neurons encode sensory stimuli by becoming tuned to fire when particular
stimuli are presented. Differential equations elegantly capture the process by
which a neuron accumulates electrical signals from other neurons and passes
them on to others, but the behavior of networks of neurons quickly becomes
too complex to be handled by mathematical analysis alone:computer models are
required to predict and explain the behavior of many interacting neurons.
Neural networks are able to adapt to new stimuli by learning, which consists of
adjusting the strengths of the synaptic connections between neurons in response
to environmental conditions. In sum, a neural mechanism is a network of neu-
rons whose synaptic connections and learning capabilities enable the network to
encode stimuli and adapt to changes in the environment.
Theoretical neuroscience is a young field that began to flourish only in the
1990s.Nevertheless,impressive progress has been made in explaining many psy-
chological phenomena concerned with perception,learning,memory,and deci-
sion making. I will now consider the potential of theoretical neuroscience for
providing mechanistic explanations of mental illness.
Theoretical Neuroscience Perspective of Mental Illness
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A biological mechanism explains the normal functioning of an organism by
showing how a system of interacting components enables the organism to oper-
ate in its environment. A disease is a breakdown in normal functioning that
impedes the organism’s performance. Breakdowns arise because internal or ex-
ternal factors affect the properties and interactions of the components of a sys-
tem in such a way that they no longer produce the regular changes that the
organism needs to function well in its environment.For example,the circulatory
system consists of a set of components—the heart, veins, arteries, and blood—
that interact to provide nutrients to the rest of the body.This mechanism is sus-
ceptible to many kinds of breakdown, such as defects in the heart valves, block-
age in the arteries due to plaque and blood clots,and abnormal growth of blood
cells.These breakdowns can arise because of many kinds of interacting causal
factors,from internal ones such as defective genes to external ones such as infec-
tious agents.
Similarly,the explanation of mental diseases requires specification of the nor-
mal functioning of the brain and other relevant organs, along with precise
description of the different kinds of breakdown that can impede mental func-
tioning. The causes of many such diseases are known approximately; for exam-
ple, epileptic seizures are the result of disturbances of the normal electrical func-
tions of the brain produced by many factors such as brain tumors. But much
remains unknown about how particular kinds of brain malfunction produce par-
ticular kinds of mental symptoms, such as the hallucinations and delusions that
afflict patients with schizophrenia.
Theoretical neuroscience should help to fill these explanatory gaps by devel-
oping computational models of normal and diseased brain operation. Normal
operation is characterized by a network of neurons whose interactions carry out
standard functions such as perception, inference, and memory. Diseased opera-
tion is characterized by alterations of the standard network that produce limita-
tions in these functions.The crudest kind of alteration would be to lesion the
simulated network by deleting a subset of artificial neurons, corresponding to
real lesions produced in human brains by strokes or assaults.Most kinds of brain
disease are much more subtle and require electrochemical interactions among
large numbers of neurons.There is more to disease than abnormality,which can
include relatively benign conditions such as left-handedness and synesthesia.
Mental illnesses involve malfunctions in brain mechanisms that are harmful.
An impressive recent illustration of how computational modeling can con-
tribute to the understanding of mental disorders is the account of attention def-
icit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) by Frank et al. (2007). Diagnostic criteria
for ADHD include the inability to attend to detailed tasks such as schoolwork,
excess physical activity,and impulsivity.To explain such symptoms,Frank and his
colleagues employed a computational model of dopamine function and dys-
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inson’s disease (Frank 2005; Frank and Claus 2006). Dopamine is also a key fac-
tor in neurocomputational models of schizophrenia (Cohen, Braver, and Brown
2002;Grossberg 2000a,2000b),and theoretical neuroscience is just beginning to
tackle the task of developing detailed models of the most dramatic symptoms of
schizophrenia:hallucinations and delusions (Behrendt andYoung 2004;Hoffman
and McGlashan 2001; Kapur 2003; Smith et al. 2007).
Theoretical neuroscience is also beginning to shed light on the most common
mental illness, depression. Neural mechanisms relevant to depressed mood seem
to include the activity of serotonin and other neurotransmitters, and also the
development of new neurons, or neurogenesis (Kramer 2005). Evidence is
mounting that a major neural cause of depression is stress-induced decreases in
neurogenesis in the dentate gyrus, part of the hippocampus (Jacobs, van Praag,
and Gage 2000). Becker and Wojtowicz (2007) have proposed a mechanism by
which altered neurogenesis affects mood state through contextual-memory for-
mation and the generation of appropriately contextualized responses to emo-
tional stimuli.
But what about the major symptom of depression, feeling sad? Graham and
Stevens (2007) argue that what makes an illness mental is its effect on conscious
representational experience, which is important for both emotional reactions
such as sadness and perceptions such as hallucinations.Philosophers who defend
a dualism of mind and body have claimed that there is an unfillable explanatory
gap between neuroscience and conscious experience,which must be understood
phenomenologically rather than scientifically.To fill this gap, theoretical neuro-
science has to draw connections, both between neural mechanisms and behav-
ior and between mechanisms and conscious experience.One effort in this direc-
tion is the model of emotional consciousness proposed by Thagard and Aubie
(n.d.),which uses interactions among many brain areas—including the prefrontal
cortex, thalamus, amygdala, and dopamine reward systems—to explain diverse
aspects of emotional experience, including differentiation, integration, intensity,
valence,and change.These brain areas integrate perceptions of bodily states of an
organism with cognitive appraisals of its current situation. Emotions are neural
processes that represent the overall cognitive and somatic state of the organism,
and conscious experience arises when neural representations achieve high acti-
vation as part of working memory. So far, the model has only been applied to
normal mental functioning, but it should be possible to consider how break-
downs in its operation can lead to affective disorders such as depression.
We can begin to sketch the mechanisms that might connect neurogenesis
with the feelings associated with depression.When stress or other causes leads to
insufficient formation of new neurons in the hippocampus,people are unable to
encode experiences flexibly and generate a broad range of explanations for
them.An ambiguous stimulus,such as a person being a bit unfriendly,will there-
Theoretical Neuroscience Perspective of Mental Illness
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as other people being unfriendly. People will then find all these experiences
emotionally coherent with such negative beliefs as that they are inherently un-
likeable, which will promote further negative interpretations of new experi-
ences, increasing sadness.
Theoretical neuroscience is only beginning to solve the problem of explain-
ing mental illness by showing how neural processes can produce abnormal be-
havior and aberrant conscious experience, and the research program I envisage
will require decades or centuries.But this section has attempted to show how,in
principle, the explanatory gap between neuroscience and psychopathology can
be filled by theoretical investigations that employ computational models. Hence
there is a possible route to solving the explanation problem in the philosophy of
psychiatry, with correlative solutions to the classification, treatment, and objec-
tivity problems.However,I must emphasize that explanation of mental disorders
should not be restricted to neural mechanisms but needs also to attend to psy-
chological and social ones.
Classifying Mental Disorders
The standard way of classifying and diagnosing mental disorders today is the
DSM,produced by theAmerican Psychiatric Society (APA 2000).A similar doc-
ument is Chapter 5 of the International Classification of Diseases, produced by the
World Health Organization (1992).The DSM lists typical symptoms for hun-
dreds of problems such as different kinds of depression and schizophrenia.These
classifications have been useful for clinical practice and research but have been
criticized for being insufficiently informed by a biomedical understanding of
mental illness.
Murphy (2006) makes three trenchant criticisms of the latest version of the
DSM, DSM-IV-TR. First, it is incoherent, in that it officially regards causal in-
formation and theoretically informed observation as impermissible but neverthe-
less relies on discriminating between disorders causally and describing their symp-
toms theoretically.Second,it is heterogeneous,in that it lumps together dissimilar
conditions and separates similar ones.Third,it is provincial in restricting attention
to conditions that have historically been the province of psychiatry, while
neglecting relevant research in areas such as cognitive psychology and neuro-
science. Murphy argues that to overcome this problem psychiatry needs a taxon-
omy based on causal discrimination rather than clinical phenomenology.
Additional criticisms of the DSM approach are made by Bentall (2004) and Gala-
tzer-Levy and Galatzer-Levy (2007).The APA is planning to produce DSM-V,
which is projected to place less emphasis on symptoms and much more on neu-
ral pathology (Kupfer, First, and Reiger 2002).
A good example of the value of a causal theory for taxonomy is the recent
controversy over whether Pluto is a planet (Sofer 2007).Pre-Copernican astron-
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moon, but the acceptance of the heliocentric theory led to the deletion of the
sun and moon as planets,and the addition of Earth.Pluto was added in 1930 but
deleted by the International Astronomical Union in 2006.The reclassification
was based on a theoretically motivated redefinition of a planet as a body massive
enough to dominate its orbital zone by flinging smaller bodies away, sweeping
them up in direct collisions, or holding them in stable orbits.This definition is
not based on the simple properties of a body, but on causal theories of the dy-
namics of gravitation.
The history of infectious diseases provides a medical example.Many infections
produce similar symptoms such as fever, and before the development of specific
germ theories there was no good way of distinguishing different febrile diseases.
However, once specific bacterial, viral, and fungal agents of infection were iden-
tified, it became possible to distinguish diseases such as malaria and tuberculosis
based on their causes and not just on their symptoms (Thagard 1999).
Similarly, it would be desirable if neuroscience could provide the basis for a
causal taxonomy of mental illnesses. Emil Kraepelin is viewed in the history of
psychiatry as having made a major advance in distinguishing between dementia
praecox (now called schizophrenia) and manic depression (now called bipolar
disorder).But schizophrenia often involves symptoms such as affective flattening
that can be part of depression, and the manic episodes in bipolar disorder can
have some delusional aspects such as inflated self-esteem or grandiosity. Natur-
ally, DSM contains an intermediate condition, schizoaffective disorder, which
combines criteria for schizophrenia with criteria for mania and/or depression.
How might theoretical neuroscience help to sort out this conceptual mess?
Suppose the explanatory gap between neuroscience and mental symptoms is
progressively filled by developments in theoretical neuroscience that describe the
molecular and neural mechanisms that affect behavior and conscious experience.
For example,it might turn out that a genetically acquired combination of genes
for dopamine receptors leads to excessive pruning of synaptic connections in the
prefrontal cortex, which leads to insufficient cortical constraints on perception,
thereby producing symptoms such as hallucinations.Suppose further that symp-
toms of major depression such as suicidal thoughts turn out to be the result of
stress-induced depletion of hippocampal neurons and connections.If these causal
explanations are reliable, and if techniques are developed to measure non-inva-
sively the degrees of cortical connectivity and hippocampal depletion,then med-
icine would have a strong basis for distinguishing the perceptual symptoms of
schizophrenia from the affective symptoms of depression. The measurement
problem is not insurmountable, thanks to the availability of techniques such as
functional magnetic resonance imaging for identifying levels of brain activity in
specific regions, and positron emission tomography for monitoring levels of
brain chemicals such as dopamine.Like the catch-all category of“fever”in Hip-
pocratic humor-based medicine, the concepts of schizophrenia and depression
Theoretical Neuroscience Perspective of Mental Illness
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psychiatry would undergo something like the substantial conceptual change
experienced by medicine in the wake of the germ theory of disease.The con-
cept of psychosis would be differentiated much more finely than is now possi-
ble with rough symptom-based categories like schizophrenia, bipolar disorder,
and Alzheimer’s disease.
Reclassification of mental illnesses in accord with theoretical neuroscience
would help enormously to solve the problems that Murphy identified with the
DSM approach.Not only would classification based on biological theory enable
principled ways of establishing similarities and differences between disorders,but
the provinciality of psychiatry would be overcome by relating it to neuroscience
and cognitive psychology.The result would be a systematic, theory-based con-
ceptual change,analogous to the dramatic changes in the classification of animals
brought about by Darwin’s theory of evolution (Thagard n.d.-b). And such
progress on the explanation problem should advance treatment of mental illness.
Treating Mental Illnesses
Although treatment for maladies such as schizophrenia and depression is some-
times highly effective, psychiatrists and other physicians are unable to predict
what drugs will be most useful for particular patients. Prescription of medica-
tions is often haphazard, with only rough heuristics or trial and error dictating
drug regimens for a given patient. For example, a patient with depression may
be serially prescribed drugs such as Prozac,Zoloft,and other antidepressants until
one works, and there is no guarantee that any drug will be effective. Similarly,
psychiatrists often try a variety of antipsychotics, such as chlorpromazine, halo-
peridol, and others,in a sometimes unsuccessful attempt to find one that resolves
a patient’s symptoms without generating intolerable side effects.Moreover,med-
ications for treating depression, schizophrenia, and other mental illnesses often
have unpleasant side effects that make patients reluctant to take them, and only
trial and error enables physicians to identify medications that minimize side ef-
fects for particular sufferers. In sum, psychiatry suffers from the treatment prob-
lem that therapy for mental illnesses is often hit or miss.
To be fair,it must be acknowledged that the same problem afflicts many other
areas of medicine. For example, a patient with hypertension can be treated with
a variety of drugs, such as calcium channel blockers,ACE inhibitors, diuretics,
and beta blockers, and the physician rarely knows in advance which of these, or
which combination, will be most effective in reducing blood pressure without
serious side effects. Similarly, cancer treatments employing different kinds of
chemotherapy and radiation have varying effectiveness for different patients and
for different stages of illness in a particular patient, and they often have serious
side effects. However, there is hope that deeper understanding of the molecular
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chance for effectiveness and avoidance of side effects. Examples of targeted can-
cer drugs based on molecular mechanisms include Gleevec for one kind of leu-
kemia and Herceptin for one kind of breast cancer.
Analogously, deeper understanding of the biochemical and neural mecha-
nisms responsible for normal mental functioning,along with identification of the
kinds of breakdowns that produce dysfunctions, should enable treatment of
mental illness to become less haphazard. Ideally, it should become possible to
diagnose a mental patient on the basis of more than behavioral symptoms.Anal-
ysis of genetics,biochemical balance,and brain area activity should not only en-
able a more precise diagnosis of the causal origins of a disease, but also provide
the basis for identifying treatments that are likely to be most effective while min-
imizing side effects.
Theoretical neuroscience is only beginning to develop the kind of mechanis-
tic understanding that will help to make such improvements in treatment possi-
ble, but there are promising developments on a number of fronts.As the molec-
ular mechanisms of dopamine functioning become better understood, it should
become possible to develop more focused treatments for diseases that involve
excess dopamine activity (schizophrenia,ADHD) or insufficient acitivity (Park-
inson’s disease). For example, Frank’s (2005) neurocomputational explanation of
how dopaminergic medication produces both improvements and side effects
may inspire pharmacological innovations that increase the former and decrease
the latter. More imminently, investigations along the lines of Frank et al. (2007)
onADHD and Smith et al.(2007) on schizophrenia should have implications for
improving treatments of these diseases.
The account of depression I gave above, linking neurogenesis and emotional
consciousness,is highly rudimentary.But it has the potential to explain why the
most effective treatments for depression are often a combination of antidepres-
sants, which increase neurogenesis, and cognitive-behavioral therapy, which en-
ables people to replace irrational beliefs about themselves with more coherent
ones that promote positive emotions.Hence understanding and improving treat-
ments for depression will require attention to molecular, neural, and psycholog-
ical mechanisms.
Although it is hard to identify pharmaceutical or psychotherapeutic discover-
ies generated by theoretical neuroscience,advances have already been made in ex-
plaining why existing treatments for depression,ADHD, Parkinson’s, and schizo-
phrenia are sometimes successful. Further investigations should make possible
more substantial advances in the difficult problem of how to treat mental illnesses.
As I discuss in the conclusion,treatments of mental illness based on neural mech-
anisms can naturally be combined with psychological and social treatments.
Theoretical Neuroscience Perspective of Mental Illness
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Finally, we come to the objectivity problem, the most fundamental one in the
philosophy of psychiatry. Writers such as Foucault (1965), Laing (1967), and
Szasz (1961) have challenged the legitimacy of the whole idea of mental illness.
Psychiatry assumes that mental disorders are as biologically objective as diseases
like infections and cancers. In contrast, Galatzer-Levy and Galatzer-Levy (2007)
report how the anti-psychiatry movement contended that “psychiatry acts pri-
marily as an instrument of social control. In this view, psychiatric diagnoses are
applied to socially undesirable behaviors in order to rationalize oppression of
offensive groups, including sexual and religious minorities, political dissenters,
and those who cause social ‘scandals’” (p. 168). Support for the anti-psychiatry
view comes from such embarrassing historical episodes as the diagnosis of“drap-
etomania” for the desire of slaves to flee their masters, the inclusion of homo-
sexuality in DSM-II and its agitated removal from later versions, and the use of
psychiatric prisons for political repression in the Soviet Union.
There are many embarrassments in the history of medicine, from the millen-
nia-long use of bloodletting as a treatment to the now discredited theory that
peptic ulcers are primarily caused by stress. However, modern medicine also
claims unchallengeable successes, such as the microbial theory of infectious dis-
eases and their treatment by antibiotics.The crucial question is whether contem-
porary psychiatry can achieve a scientific, medical basis that would nullify the
claim that it is merely a tool for social control.
By helping to solve the explanation, classification, and treatment problems,
theoretical neuroscience can go a long way to solving the objectivity problem.
Epidemiological evidence of mental illnesses across cultures suggests that diseases
such as schizophrenia and depression are not merely social constructs. Neuro-
science is beginning to provide the biological basis for the view that mental ill-
nesses are just as objectively real as infections, cancers, and other diseases.There
is ample reason to reject the extreme social constructivist claim that all diseases,
like all scientific constructs, lack objectivity (Thagard 1999). Given the evident
suffering of those afflicted and the modest success of biologically based treat-
ments, the claim that mental illnesses are merely constructed instruments of so-
cial control is already implausible.Attacks on the objectivity of mental illness will
become even more ridiculous if mental illnesses can be effectively classified on
the basis of the causal mechanisms that produce them,if these causal mechanisms
provide detailed pathways from genetic and environmental conditions to mental
symptoms,and if biological understanding paves the way for improved therapies.
I expect that advances in theoretical and experimental neuroscience will satisfy
all these requirements.
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My claims about the philosophical relevance of theoretical neuroscience have
been largely speculative, dependent on extrapolations about how progress in
understanding the biological underpinnings of mental illness may continue.
Many philosophers and even some scientists will naturally remain skeptical about
how scientific developments could possibly have such large relevance to philo-
sophical issues.Science,after all,cannot provide the a priori,necessary truths that
many have thought to be required for philosophical understanding. How can
empirical and theoretical methods in neuroscience and other fields possibly shed
light on philosophical problems? I will now try to sketch generally how science
is directly relevant to such problems.
Here are what seem to me to be the four most important philosophical ques-
tions in metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics, the central areas of philosophy:
what is reality,how do we know reality,what is the difference between right and
wrong,and why is life worth living?The greatest philosophers,such as Plato,Aris-
totle, Hume,and Kant,have offered explicit or implicit answers to some or all of
these questions.For Plato,Kant,and many other thinkers,the answers need to be
sought in supernatural directions involving Platonic Forms, God, or truths that
can be established for all possible worlds, not just the one that science studies.
In contrast,philosophical naturalism attempts to answer these questions based
on scientific investigations of the world that people actually inhabit.The first
question,about the nature of reality,cannot be answered a priori but depends on
the results of empirical/theoretical investigations in all the sciences,from physics,
chemistry,and biology to psychology and even sociology.These sciences are each
restricted to particular aspects of reality—for example,physics to laws of motion
that apply to various kinds of objects,or sociology to principles that describe the
operation of people in groups and organizations. Philosophical investigations in
metaphysics are much more general than research in any particular science,look-
ing at questions about the overall nature of what exists, including the nature of
space and time.
Why should we prefer a naturalistic approach to reality to supernatural ones?
There are two main reasons: the failure of supernaturalism to establish any kind
of consensus about the nature of reality, and the success of science in producing
reliable interactions with reality.Supernatural metaphysics based on a priori rea-
soning or religious faith has failed to provide any justification for preferring one
answer about what exists to competing answers. Is there one god or many? Are
the gods benevolent or malevolent?Was the world created recently or eons ago?
Do souls precede conception,as Hindus and ancient Greeks believed,or are they
created at conception,as many Christians believe? As disagreements among the-
ologians and a prioristic philosophers show, no one has come up with a way to
determine which of alternative supernaturalistic theories gives better answers to
questions about the nature of reality.
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ing with them: comparative evaluation of competing theories based on which
ones best explain the results of observation and experiment.These methods have
ancient precedents, but their systematic application only began in the 16th and
17th centuries.The main reason we have for thinking that scientific methods
have often provided a grip on reality is the many technological applications of
experimentally established scientific theories.To take just two examples,physical
theories about atoms and electrons have enabled technologies such as comput-
ers, and biological theories about diseases and germs have produced medical ad-
vances such as antibiotics.(For a more general argument about science and truth,
see Thagard 2007.) Science has been much more successful in grasping reality
than supernaturalism, so philosophy should ally itself with science in its meta-
physical investigations. In particular, if philosophy of psychiatry wants to under-
stand the nature of minds and the diseases that afflict them, it stands to learn
more from scientific investigations in psychology and neuroscience than from
inquiries that are supernatural or purely conceptual.Cognitive neuroscience has
already made substantial progress in understanding such psychological phenom-
ena as perception,attention,memory,problem solving,and language (Smith and
Kosslyn 2007).
Because science is the best way to purse the nature of reality, it is also highly
relevant to answering the central epistemological question of how we know real-
ity. Lacking supernatural souls with a special access to a priori truths, humans
must rely on the minds we have, which fortunately can be investigated by the
cognitive sciences such as psychology and neuroscience.Much has been learned
about the workings of human minds, ranging from basic perceptual processes
shared with other minds to high-level scientific reasoning. (For an accessible
introduction to cognitive science, see Thagard 2005.) Psychology and neuro-
science are learning more and more about how minds gain knowledge about the
world, so it is pointless for epistemology to proceed in the a priori and intro-
spective modes that have been preferred by many philosophers.This is not to say
that epistemology can be replaced by psychology and neuroscience,whose inves-
tigations have tended to be much more narrowly focused on particular percep-
tual and cognitive processes.Epistemology remains important for raising general
questions about the relation between mental states and the world, as well as for
normative questions about how minds can work better to learn more about the
world. But these general and normative questions are dependent on a basic
understanding of how minds work, which requires psychology and neuro-
science. Hence epistemology,like metaphysics,should be naturalistic.Even more
controversially, a case can be made that ethics can best be approached naturalis-
tically, addressing questions about the nature of right and wrong and the mean-
ing of life.
Descombes (2001) offers a critique of cognitivism, which he takes to be the
view that mental phenomena such as intentions are purely internal to a person
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Wittgenstein to argue that intentional states should be understood anthropolog-
ically in terms of a person’s social history and education. It might seem that if
Descombes is right then my attempts to use neuroscience to explain mental ill-
ness are seriously defective: mental problems cannot just be brain problems, be-
cause mental states such as those found in people suffering from schizophrenia
and depression are inherently social. Mental illnesses afflict persons, not brains.
Descombes’s arguments might be effective against narrow versions of the cog-
nitive approach such as that advocated by his major target, Jerry Fodor (1987).
But current research in cognitive neuroscience, including the computational
modeling that occurs in theoretical neuroscience,is thoroughly compatible with
the view that mental states need to be understood partly in terms of their rela-
tion to the external world,including social history.First,brain representations are
understood as patterns of neural firing that result from interactions that tune
neurons to collectively encode real-world physical magnitudes (Eliasmith and
Anderson 2003). Such interactions depend on the nature of our perceptual sys-
tems, so that brain states are a function of the structure of our bodies, as well as
of the world and previous brain states. Saying that mental states are brain states
does not make them purely internal as Descombes charges, because brain states
are formed in part through a history of interactions with the world. Second,
neuroscience is increasingly aware that many of these interactions are social,
involving communication with other people.There is a rapidly growing field,
social cognitive neuroscience, that investigates the neural mechanisms of social
cognition and social interaction in humans and animals (Easton and Emery
2005). Such investigations imply that brain states depend in part on an organ-
ism’s history of social interactions.Hence there is no basis to the claim that neu-
roscience cannot explain mental illness because its account of mental states neg-
lects their external, social, and historical nature. Of course, neuroscience does
neglect what supernaturalists take to be the spiritual nature of mental states, but
such neglect is justified by lack of evidence that minds are souls.
Conclusion
Proponents of a more humanistic approach to psychiatry will be inclined to re-
ject my enthusiasm for theoretical neuroscience as a manifestation of a mis-
guided scientism and reductionism.But mine is not an unrestricted scientism,as
I readily acknowledge that there are normative issues about right and wrong that
science by itself does not resolve. I have been concerned in this article with the
epistemology of mental illness, but a complete philosophical discussion would
also require a discussion of psychiatry from the perspective of an ethics of care
(Tauber 2005).
And I am certainly not defending a kind of ruthless reductionism, in which
the only legitimate scientific explanations are those that occur at the most basic
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emotional thinking requires attention to interconnected mechanisms at four dif-
ferent levels, the social, cognitive, neural, and molecular (Thagard 2006). Sim-
ilarly, although this article has focused on neural and biochemical explanations
of mental illness,it is compatible with the view that psychiatry should also attend
to psychological and social causes (Bentall 2004). It follows immediately that
treatment of mental illness should employ psychological and social interventions
such as psychotherapy and stress reduction, in addition to pharmaceutical ones
inspired by advances in neurobiology.
I have argued that attention to current and potential advances in the bur-
geoning field of theoretical neuroscience can help to solve four of the major
problems in the philosophy of psychiatry: explanation, classification, treatment,
and objectivity. In accord with the approach defended at the beginning of this
essay,my argument has been naturalistic,drawing philosophical conclusions from
connections with the best scientific work in many fields,including neuroscience,
medicine, psychology, and molecular biology. I have proposed no conclusions as
a priori truths, and sought conceptual clarification, not by the abstract analysis
of the use of words, but by exploring the implications of scientific theories well
supported by experimental evidence. In contrast to the quietist Wittgensteinian
view of philosophy, I have aggressively proposed how psychiatry ought to pro-
gress through close association with theoretical neuroscience and allied fields
such as biochemistry. Like science, philosophy should aim not just to analyze
concepts, but to change them.
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